Has re-elected Modi stepped on China’s ‘red line’?
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Narendra Modi’s coalition, won a simple majority in India’s general elections in June 2024, giving him a chance to remain as prime minister. He is renowned for his skills to outwit opponents and retain allies. However, his tasks are cut out in a polarised national political ambience that might influence India’s foreign policy options.
‘One India’ vs ‘one China’
Modi and the NDA were congratulated by the leaders of the P5 — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) — except notably China’s Xi Jinping. Nonetheless, the Chinese foreign ministry subsequently rectified the apparent omission, leading India to express “appreciation” for China’s congratulatory message.
Even regarding Tibet, Delhi has maintained that it did not accept Chinese claims over India’s Arunachal Pradesh (including the strategic Tawang) which Beijing describes as “southern Tibet”. From India’s perspective, the PRC’s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan under the “one-China principle” could be accepted if Beijing would explicitly accept Delhi’s “one India” policy. At the least, “one India” is a strategic code for Delhi’s ongoing exercise of sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh.
Aksai Chin, which China administers, and Gilgit-Baltistan as well as “Azad Kashmir”, both under Pakistan’s control with Chinese support, come under the “one India” rubric. Delhi opposes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which passes through some areas under India’s historical “sovereignty”. However, with Beijing not accepting Delhi’s “one India” policy, the latter has been reticent about supporting the “one-China principle”.
Delhi is particularly concerned about Beijing’s readiness to build an “upgraded version” of the already extensive CPEC. Indeed, Xi assured Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of this shortly after China protested India’s reference to Lai as “president of the Republic of China” (ROC) in a press release from the Ministry of External Affairs. India later deleted the document, preferring this spiralling Sino-Indian controversy to remain a storm in a teacup.
In a gesture seemingly acknowledging India’s removal of the ROC reference, Chinese Premier Li Qiang sent a congratulatory message to Modi on 11 June 2024. However, notably absent was a similar message from Xi, who congratulated South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, another prominent leader from the global south, on 14 June for his reelection.
India’s tech links with Taiwan and the US
The latest episode of Lai-Modi X bonhomie does symbolise the sensitivities, perhaps even a new fragility, in the Sino-Indian equation. Nonetheless, a close reading of their messages does not indicate any Indian recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state.
Ironically, the name of the ROC is still shown in Article 23 of the UN Charter as a permanent member of the UNSC. The ROC was unseated from that position in 1971 when the PRC’s lawful rights were “restored”. Due to the strategic situation of that period, the UN Charter was not amended to reflect the PRC’s newly exalted position.
Reciprocating Lai’s “warm message” on 5 June 2024, Modi expressed willingness to build “closer ties” with Taiwan “as we work towards mutually beneficial economic and technological partnership”. Lai had, in his message, emphasised “expanding our collaboration on trade, technology and other sectors”. Both sides clearly focused on economic and technological ties.
This episode should not immediately alarm China. However, two factors are pertinent to its calculations. First, contrary to earlier indications, India may now start to bandwagon with the pro-Taiwan forces led by the US. Second, India-Taiwan tech ties could get woven into Washington’s plans for the globalisation of technology outside of China.
As a rising power in the cyber and artificial intelligence domains, India’s enhanced tech collaboration with the pivotal Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) might serve US interests. On the other hand, Beijing has already begun to view the TSMC as a potential Chinese asset. All these ifs concerning India are, therefore, relevant to Beijing in the ongoing Sino-American tussle for tech supremacy.
Until now, India has not prominently figured in this US-China competition (as outlined by Chris Miller in Chip War and other authors). However, US President Joe Biden, in his congratulatory conversation with Modi on 5 June 2024, described the US-India “strategic technology partnership” as a “trusted” bilateral priority.
In a slightly contrarian perspective, there is a significant Chinese school of thought that still bets on India’s strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the US. A piece in China Daily headlined “India will not be a willing pawn of US” notes that Delhi “has always been cautious about not being drawn into any direct confrontation with China”. India’s recent deletion of a press release where Taiwan was referred to as the ROC, may be compatible with this Chinese view.
In the wake of Chinese protests over the Lai-Modi X messaging in June 2024, both Delhi and Beijing need a fresh and robust approach towards each other.
This could be a good time to consider resuming publicised formal discussions, at the established level of special representatives, to resolve the basic boundary dispute. A potential Indian option is to press for the formal and publicised renewal of such basic negotiations. Such an approach could amplify public trust in the Sino-Indian engagement.
The second, but not secondary, issue is India’s trade imbalance with China. India’s External Affairs Minister Subahmanyam Jaishankar said, on 24 May 2024, that Delhi’s bilateral annual trade in goods with both China and the US was worth US$118 billion each. Modi’s messaging in June 2024 about his willingness for closer trade and tech partnership with Taiwan can spur China to try and open new vistas in its trade with India. As a policy option, India could explore a more balanced trade with China.
The third policy option for India is to explore the feasibility of practical tech ties with China either bilaterally or in the recently expanded BRICS. The founding members of this forum of Brazil, Russia, India and China later welcomed South Africa, besides several other countries more recently. For Delhi, this option will be a tough call, especially in competitive domains like artificial intelligence (AI) where India, not just China, has great expectations. However, Xi had in the past suggested AI collaboration within the compact BRICS forum.
The final, yet crucial, policy option for India regarding China is to pursue greater clarity in each other’s strategic priorities through bilateral dialogue. Beijing seems concerned about the escalating US-India entente despite some contrary analysis. Mindful of its implications for both India and the US, Delhi remains wary of Beijing’s deepening ties with Pakistan.
But all in all, these policy options in India-China relations are just that — options on the drawing board. The respective competitive nationalism of China and India, grounded in their actual and potential comprehensive strengths, will be the ultimate reality test.
Post Comment