China’s land grab in Seoul has global consequences

A controversy has sparked in South Korea over the Chinese government’s purchase of approximately 4,000 square meters of land in one of Seoul’s most strategically sensitive districts. The development has raised serious questions about China’s underlying intentions behind the deal.

Concerns have emerged regarding the location of these plots and how China may have exploited Korean law to its advantage. The purchased plots are situated close to some of Korea’s most sensitive security sites, including the Office of the President in the Yongsan District, the planned relocation site of the U.S. Embassy at Camp Coiner, and several key diplomatic residences in nearby Hannam-dong. The site is also near the GTX-A subway line, a major ongoing infrastructure project in the capital.

Chinese land acquisitions are not just about geography—they are about influence. Ownership near sensitive infrastructure gives Beijing potential access, oversight, and even leverage.

In December 2018, the Chinese government purchased 11 plots totaling 4,162 square meters in Itaewon-dong, Yongsan District, for $21.4 million USD. The final payment was completed in July 2019. Land registry records list the buyer as the People’s Republic of China, and there has been no change in ownership since.

What has raised eyebrows is the installation of surveillance cameras on the site shortly after the purchase. Notably, no development work has taken place on the land, even after six years. This prolonged inactivity, coupled with the presence of surveillance equipment, has fueled speculation and deepened suspicions about the true purpose of the acquisition.

Experts have also flagged the surprising number of homes in South Korea owned by minors from China—an implausible scenario for Korean minors, who typically do not have sufficient income to purchase property.

According to Chosun Daily, Chinese citizens are the largest group of foreign property holders in South Korea. Their numbers surged from 54,320 in 2020 to 96,955 in April 2024—a staggering 78.5% increase. Their share of total foreign ownership also rose significantly, from 35.3% to 41.6%.

A similar backlash has been seen in the United States, where foreign ownership—particularly by Chinese entities—has stirred political and public outcry.

Data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture shows that foreign investors have been steadily acquiring agricultural land. While Texas, Colorado, and Maine hold the largest shares of foreign-owned farmland, states like Nebraska and Oklahoma have seen dramatic increases over the past decade. In Nebraska, foreign-owned farmland has grown fivefold—from over 153,000 acres in 2014 to 936,000 acres in 2023. In Oklahoma, that number has nearly quadrupled—from 371,000 to 1.8 million acres.

More than half of US states have introduced laws banning or limiting foreign ownership of land, though approaches vary. Congress has also proposed targeted bans on companies with ties to China. According to Investigate Midwest, Chinese-owned companies now control over 277,000 acres of US farmland. The majority is held by corporations like Syngenta Seeds, Smithfield Foods (a major pork processor), and a private solar panel company.

USDA Secretary Brooke Rollins and former President Donald Trump have voiced concerns about these acquisitions, calling them threats to national security and economic sovereignty. Although China controls just about 1% of all foreign-owned land in the U.S., experts argue that the strategic location of these properties matters far more than their overall scale.

Ironically, China’s aggressive land acquisition strategy has not been limited to Korea and the U.S. alone.

The $2.5-billion Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipeline (MCOGP) project—the largest Chinese FDI project in Myanmar—is one such example. During its implementation, Chinese state-owned firms such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), South East Asia Oil Pipeline Co. Ltd. (SEAOP), and South East Asia Gas Pipeline Co. Ltd. (SEAGP) were found to have illegally acquired land, violating Myanmar’s land laws. The pipeline, which stretches 793 km from Kyauk Phyu in Rakhine State to Nam Kham near the Chinese border, caused significant environmental degradation and disrupted the lives of local farmers. According to the Myanmar-China Pipeline Watch Committee (MCPWC), the project was plagued by inadequate compensation, lack of transparency, and major social costs.

China’s activities in these countries reveal a consistent pattern of leveraging economic deals to gain control over strategically significant land—often to the detriment of local populations and national interests.

Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt raised alarms in November 2023 over Chinese entities purchasing land to establish marijuana farms—possibly with more clandestine motives. This came months after the U.S. Air Force shot down a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon over North America. Then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin confirmed that it was being used by China to monitor strategic U.S. sites.

The spy balloon incident triggered a wave of national security concerns and legislative responses. In 2023 alone, lawmakers in 33 U.S. states proposed over 80 bills aimed at prohibiting the Chinese government, its business entities, or even Chinese nationals from buying agricultural land or land near military installations. Many of these have since been passed into law, with similar actions proposed at the federal level.

Meanwhile, China has quietly expanded its military footprint across Africa, capitalizing on the low priority assigned to the continent by global media and major powers. This has allowed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to build bases and exert influence in various African nations with minimal international scrutiny.

China’s real estate acquisitions across the globe are not mere investment ventures—they are strategic moves that challenge the sovereignty, security, and legal frameworks of host nations. It is amply clear that China has consistently exploited legal loopholes, economic vulnerabilities, and political complacency to serve its long-term geopolitical agenda.

Governments can no longer afford to treat foreign land ownership as a secondary issue. It is of utmost concern. Policy loopholes are dangerous—and they must be closed swiftly.