Time for QUAD to step up to Taiwan’s defense
Taiwan’s 40th Han Kuang military exercise, its most extensive to date, spans ten days and simulates a full-scale Chinese invasion. The drills incorporate amphibious assaults, joint-force coordination and extensive civilian-military integration across multiple domains.
Taiwan is also showcasing enhanced deterrent capabilities with US-supplied HIMARS rocket systems, F-16V fighter jets and indigenous Sky Sword II and Sky Bow III missile systems.
The activation of 22,000 reservists marks an unprecedented expansion of national defense mobilization, signaling Taiwan’s growing commitment to preparing for conflict rather than merely deterring it.
This shift is a direct response to the People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly aggressive behavior. Gray-zone coercion has become routine. PLA aircraft and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait’s median line surged from 565 in 2022 to over 3,070 in 2024, an average of more than eight per day.
In January 2025 alone, Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone recorded 248 crossings by China, which represents a 75% increase compared to January 2022.
These provocations are designed to wear down Taiwan’s defenses without crossing the threshold into open conflict, reflecting China’s long-term strategy of psychological pressure, strategic normalization and the gradual erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty through fatigue.
But Taiwan is no longer waiting passively for external support. It is building an active and layered defense strategy in anticipation of a volatile future. This recalibration has drawn attention from Taiwan’s strategic partners, particularly Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) members.
Originally conceived as a maritime security initiative, the QUAD has evolved into a broader Indo-Pacific framework committed to ensuring a free, open and rules-based regional order. Yet the Taiwan question exposes the bloc’s limitations.
