Narrative Tops Infrastructure in US-China Rivalry
In the realm of geopolitical competition, power is often measured in trade volumes secured, ports built, or loans issued. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is typically evaluated through these tangible resources and material metrics: trillion of dollars pledged, railways laid, ports expanded. But focusing only on concrete and capital misses a critical battleground where global power is increasingly contested— the battle over narratives. In Latin America, the struggle between the U.S. and China reveals a central truth of modern geopolitics: influence is not just built, but it’s narrated.
Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has positioned China as a key actor in global development. In Latin America, Chinese financing has flowed into energy, minerals, digital infrastructure, and transport. Yet China’s success has not depended solely on its ability to fund projects quickly and at scale. Beijing has also invested heavily in shaping how those projects are understood by governments, media, and the public. Through state-backed outlets such as CGTN Español and Xinhua, journalist training programs, and content-sharing agreements with local media, China has worked to frame the BRI as a story of “South–South cooperation,” mutual respect, and development without political interference.
This narrative strategy matters. By taking a proactive approach to perception, China frames the BRI as a good-natured alternative to Western aid. China has taken tangible steps to protect itself from criticism, even when projects often encounter corruption scandals, environmental damage, or cost overruns. The United States, by contract, has struggled to get a strong foothold in this narrative arena. Washington’s messaging around the BRI has been primarily reactive and warning-based. US media officials have emphasized “debt-trap diplomacy,” national security concerns, and nontransparent contracts associated with China’s BRI. Despite these concerns being valid, they project fear instead of aspiration and for governments facing urgent development needs, warnings without visible alternatives can ring hollow.
The result is a narrative imbalance. China offers a clear story: we build, we deliver, we respect your sovereignty. The United States often offers a counter-story: be careful, there are risks, do it with us instead. In regions like Latin America, where US intervention has historically been strong, the latter message can struggle to persuade, especially when US-backed infrastructure projects are fewer, slower, or less visible.
A disparity is evident when examining Panama and Ecuador. In Panama, the United States’ method of presenting information proved highly successful. US representatives and news outlets consistently demonstrated their relationship with Panama as a priority, and characterized Chinese infrastructure near the Panama Canal as a threat to Panama’s sovereignty and national security. Considering Panama’s historical relationship with the United States and the Canal’s significance, this perspective was well-received. Local media outlets amplified concerns regarding over-reliance on China igniting a shift in elite discourse. Consequently, Panama halted significant BRI projects and reduced its involvement with Beijing, not due to greater financial investment by the United States, but because Washington successfully influenced the perception of Chinese involvement.
Ecuador tells a different story. Chinese financing is woven into the national economy through oil-backed loans and major infrastructure investments. Although Ecuadorian media highlighted significant flaws in China-built dams and energy projects, US leverage remained marginal. Washington’s most successful initiative, the Galápagos debt-for-nature swap, worked precisely because it offered a compelling counter-narrative: environmental stewardship, sovereignty, and long-term sustainability. Media coverage framed the deal as innovative and responsible, contrasting sharply with earlier Chinese projects. Yet even this narrative success could not fully displace China’s economic centrality. Ecuador diversified; it did not realign as they expressed they care about delivery and results, something China could provide much more consistently than the United States.
These cases represent a broader takeaway: media framing does not replace material power, but it shapes how material power is received. China understands this. Its media strategy is centralized, proactive, and consistent. The United States, despite its advantages in quality and transparency, often underperforms in the realm of storytelling.
In order to effectively compete with China in Latin America, the United States must pair high standards with visible delivery, and critiques with credible alternatives. It also means engaging local media not merely as amplifiers of US warnings, but as partners in telling stories that align development, sovereignty, and democratic governance.
In today’s geopolitical landscape, power flows through perception as much as through pipelines. China’s Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates that controlling the story often means controlling the outcome. If the United States hopes to remain influential in Latin America it must recognize that in the contest for global power, narratives are critical strategic assets.
