Quilts Over Combat: The Illusion of Discipline in China’s Modern Military Machine
In a recent viral video from Lugong Island, China’s Marine Corps found itself at the centre of a curious spectacle. A group of new recruits was shown fumbling with the simple but symbolically loaded task of folding military quilts. The squad leader’s angry commands echoed through the barracks as he demanded precision and speed from soldiers with just three months of experience. When the results failed to impress misshapen folds, uneven corners, he punished the entire company by ordering them to carry their defective quilts downstairs and reassemble in formation. The incident was trivial on its surface, yet it ignited widespread online commentary about the state of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), raising a question few dared to ask outright: is the image of China’s military might build more on performance than substance?
In the CCP’s armed forces, quilt folding isn’t a mundane housekeeping chore. The task is elevated to a test of discipline, symbolizing precision, obedience, and readiness. The quilts, often compared to tofu blocks, must be perfectly square, smooth, and firm without a single crease. Veterans have reportedly gone so far as to sew stiff canvas into their quilts, creating artificial perfection for inspections. Several commentators noted that beyond the first year, these same “perfect” quilts are simply stored away and wheeled out for display when needed. The ritual, in many ways, encapsulates an uncomfortable truth: what is touted as rigor may often be ceremonial, a tightly managed image rather than a reflection of actual military readiness.
This dissonance between appearance and capability surfaces repeatedly in assessments of China’s armed forces. While state media heralds the PLA’s modernization advanced jet fighters, cutting-edge satellites, digital command systems expert analyses suggest systemic dysfunction beneath the gloss. According to Taiwan’s Institute for National Defence and Security Research, China’s push toward joint operations modelled after Western militaries faces fundamental barriers in command culture. In operational decisions, political committees often override military judgment. Reports of submarine surfacing being debated in lengthy meeting illustrate how ideological supervision stymies responsiveness. The chain of command, instead of streamlining execution, becomes a web of bureaucratic friction.
The contradiction plays out in battlefield simulations and planning exercises, where authority becomes fragmented. A commander might issue an order to strike, only for the political commissar to block it, triggering internal disputes that stall real-time decision-making. Experts have pointed out that such delays could be catastrophic in modern warfare, where seconds count. Far from embodying swift and synchronized strategy, the CCP’s dream of a combat-ready military appears bogged down by ideological entanglements and top-heavy governance.
Beyond structure and leadership, demographic shifts have further complicated recruitment and training. Once home to 400 million youth under 18, China’s population under that threshold had shrunk to 240 million by 2023, a drop from 35% to under 20%. While the PLA still commands a large absolute pool of potential recruits compared to nations like the United States, the challenge isn’t quantity but quality. Many young men products of the one-child policy era are perceived as lacking resilience, both physically and mentally. Commanders note difficulty in moulding these individuals into combat-ready soldiers. The pampered upbringing typical of China’s urban middle class has resulted in new recruits who struggle with basic physical tasks. Complaints about push-ups, long runs, and rigorous training flood anonymous platforms. Some even turn to psychological counselling just to endure boot camp, signalling a gap not easily bridged by incentives alone.
Attempts to bolster recruitment higher salaries, educational perks, job placement guarantees have met limited success. College students remain largely uninterested in military service, wary of the discipline, ideological immersion, and limited upward mobility. Military academies suffer high dropout rates, and those who leave are branded as deserters, effectively locked out of state career paths. While the PLA continues to highlight its non-commissioned officer (NCO) system as a pillar of stability, the reality is more sobering. High salaries for seasoned sergeants and retirement privileges can’t mask the fact that pairing veterans with weak, unmotivated youth rarely delivers the kind of integration needed in high-tech conflict scenarios.
Meanwhile, corruption and misallocated resources continue to corrode operational strength. Despite lavish spending on flagships like the J-20 stealth fighter and aircraft carriers, many frontline units remain stuck with outdated gear. The 80th Army Group, for instance, is reportedly still fielding Type 59 tanks and Type 86 infantry fighting vehicles hardware that belongs in museums rather than on battlefields. Satirical comments on Chinese social media joke about tanks made of iron balls and drills conducted purely to satisfy performance metrics. Resource concentration toward Taiwan-facing army groups leaves others scrambling with obsolescence, undermining claims of unified modernization.
The deeper problem appears not in the military’s lack of ambition, but in the state’s reliance on symbolic success and image management. The insistence on folded quilts as proxies for discipline, the emphasis on political loyalty over tactical competence, and the prioritization of spectacle over substance all point to an institutional malaise. The fabric of China’s military aspirations may be stitched more tightly around ideology than around genuine preparedness.
For observers watching from outside, the viral quilt-folding video may seem like a comical anecdote. Yet it encapsulates how performance rituals and centralized control intersect to form a brittle military culture one polished for display but structurally hamstrung when it comes to action. As the CCP strives to assert regional dominance and project strength abroad, the gap between ambition and reality grows more visible. Whether this theatricality will hold under pressure remains an open and increasingly urgent question.
