The Taiwan Strait’s Deepening Divide

Tensions are brewing once more in the Taiwan Strait. A new administration in Taipei, led by President Lai Ching-te, believes clear affirmations of Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty and autonomy from China are necessary in order to push back against an increasingly imperious and aggressive Beijing. China finds Taipei’s stance to be dangerously defiant, particularly because Beijing believes it extended a good-will offer to the incoming administration prior to inauguration. China has responded with shows of military strength and will continue to explore new ways to challenge Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. While war is unlikely to break out over Taiwan in the near term, continuing down a path of confrontation will reduce space for the two governments to manage their differences over the long term. Taipei should return to more measured assertions of its de facto sovereignty, Beijing should reduce its military harassment of Taiwan and Washington should remind both parties of why doing so is in their interests.

In his first 100 days, President Lai has met Beijing’s aggressiveness toward Taiwan with a tougher stance, amplifying already heightened tensions in the process. His inauguration speech set the tone, with Lai stating his party’s longstanding view that Taiwan is a sovereign state that is separate from China. He did so, however, in more explicit terms than previous presidents from Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party had when they assumed office. He also dispensed with ambiguities that his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen had maintained to balance her assertions of Taiwan’s sovereignty and prevent relations with China from hitting rock bottom. While Tsai referenced Taiwan’s constitution as a gesture to Beijing’s view that the two sides of the strait belong to “one China”, Lai used it to challenge China’s position. In so doing, he set what he believes to be the correct terms of the cross-strait relationship, one that reflects the reality of Taiwan’s de facto autonomy. Indeed, Beijing’s escalating pressures during the Tsai years have deepened convictions in Taipei that more tact will not produce moderation on China’s part. 

For China, Lai’s inauguration speech was a slap in the face. Despite its repeated attacks on him throughout the presidential campaign, Beijing had softened its rhetoric after the election in January. It offered what it saw as a more flexible characterisation of the cross-strait relationship, saying that the two sides belong to a “Chinese nation”, bound by familial, cultural and historical ties. This was a departure from Beijing’s usual demand that all Taiwanese parties agree to the 1992 consensus – a verbal understanding reached between Beijing and Taiwan’s opposition party the Kuomintang around the idea, which has become politically toxic to many Taiwanese, that the two sides belong to “one China”. In offering the additional formulation, Beijing sought to make it easier for the incoming Lai administration to signal interest in improving relations. 

While China would have responded negatively to Lai even had he adhered to Tsai’s line, his speech struck a nerve in Beijing. To communicate its ire with both Taipei and Washington, the Chinese government issued furious denunciations and staged a highly publicised military exercise. That it took a full day for China to escalate its rhetoric and a few days for it to flex its military muscle suggests Beijing may have anticipated a more moderate tone from Lai and had to recalibrate its response after digesting the implications of his speech. In the months since Lai’s inauguration, China has significantly ratcheted up its military activities around Taiwan, maintained maritime law enforcement pressures, and begun to wield its legal tools for prosecuting average Taiwanese for “acts of secessionism”. 

Despite the sabre-rattling, Beijing continues to see more risk than reward in bringing about unification through a military assault on Taiwan. Aside from the risk of entering into a direct conflict with the U.S., Beijing is dealing with discontent over slowing economic growth and corruption in its military. While China has adopted retaliatory measures against Taiwan and the U.S., it has also continued to project confidence that unification will eventually happen and has downplayed the significance of Lai’s more confrontational posture.

No political resolution that can bridge the increasingly laid-bare cross-strait divide is evident, but both Beijing and Taipei would benefit from lowering the temperature in the immediate term and maintain manoeuvring space for the management of tensions over time. This is especially true given uncertainties over what the next U.S. administration’s cross-strait approach will be. Lai should return to more balanced and selective public affirmations of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Beijing should pull back its denunciations of the Lai administration and maintain the more flexible characterisation of the cross-strait relationship it adopted prior to the inauguration. It should also reduce its military activities around the island. 

As tensions mount, channels of communications between the DPP and Beijing are even more critical. Formal political dialogue between Lai’s administration and Beijing is improbable anytime soon. But work to reduce distrust between the two sides should begin now. Back channels linking decision-makers are important for conveying intentions. Informal discussions in neutral locations involving government-designated scholars and retired officials can also help reduce misunderstandings. Leaders on both sides should take concrete steps toward resuming student exchanges and group tourism across the strait, which can help foster the conditions for improved relations down the line. 

As the gulf between the two sides widens, Washington’s role is more important –and more difficult. Until November’s election and, ideally afterward regardless of who wins, the U.S. should convey privately to both sides the benefits of managing cross-strait tensions with caution and flexibility while making clear its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either. With China, Washington should make clear to Beijing that its muscle flexing will come with added reputational cost for China and will accelerate efforts by the U.S. and its Asian allies to balance against China’s growing influence. At the same time, the U.S. should make clear to Beijing that it did not encourage Lai to strike a tougher posture. With Taiwan, Washington should continue supporting the island’s efforts to deepen its defence reforms so that the cost of military aggression is clear to China. But it is also important that Washington remind Taipei of the benefits of a more measured tone when talking about its sovereignty, not least of which is continued support from the U.S. and other foreign powers.