The OIC is becoming less credible. It would rather have relations with China than denounce the persecution of Uyghurs.

Last week, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation delegation visited Beijing and northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region between 16 to 19 October. Largely underreported, but this development holds weight. This visit comes in the backdrop of criticism by the West and international organisations on China’s poor human rights record in Xinjiang, especially the reported arbitrary detention of millions of Uyghur Muslims and the so-called “re-education camps.”

The OIC visited Xinjiang in 2023 too to observe the living conditions of the Muslim community in the area. Considering OIC is the biggest organisation with 57 members from Muslim-majority countries, it has remained silent on the state of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, which raises the question of their institutional integrity.

OIC’s deafening inaction 

Since its foundation in 1969, the organisation has actively represented “the Muslims by espousing all causes close to the hearts of over 1.5 billion Muslims of the world,” including the ongoing Gaza war. But its silence on the reported oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang at the hands of the Chinese state has been puzzling.

On the visit, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the OIC delegation appreciates China’s support for Islamic countries in safeguarding sovereignty, independence, and economic development” and emphasised plans to “deepen strategic mutual trust, strengthen practical cooperation, expand cultural exchanges, and uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.” The OIC is yet to release a statement on the visit, but any response would likely echo previous ones, praising infrastructure development in Xinjiang and promoting “people-to-people” ties.

Such delegation-level visits from OIC are often seen as part of Chinese efforts to build a narrative that counters Western accusations of human rights violations. The US, in particular, has been critical of China’s forced “measures to assimilate Uyghurs into Han Chinese society and reduce the influences of Uyghur, Islamic, and Arabic cultures and languages” in the name of countering terrorism and separatism.

2022 UN report 

In August 2022, a United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner report on “human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China” made alarming observations on “numerous reports of the detention of large numbers of ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, under the pretext of countering religious extremism in XUAR.”

Taking a serious cognisance of the forced disappearances, the UN recommended China “release all individuals arbitrarily imprisoned in XUAR”. The UN called on the authorities in August 2024 to undertake a full review of the human rights perspective. Still, China dismisses these calls, alleging they reflect a Western bias rather than a genuine concern for human rights.

Xinjiang—a key gateway for Belt and Road Initiative

Since the advent of the Communist regime in China in 1949, Xinjiang, like Tibet, has presented a challenge to the Chinese government’s goal of national unity and territorial integrity. Considering the region is rich in minerals, produces “over 80% of China’s cotton, and has China’s largest coal and natural gas reserves and a fifth of its oil reserves,” complete control over the region is important in exploiting such resources.

Today, Xinjiang is becoming a heavy-military zone and surveillance region due to its centrality to China’s President Xi Jinping’s multi-billion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), linking China to South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. The vast region is a buffer zone between China and potentially unstable neighbours such as Afghanistan and a vital gateway of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Uprisings in Xinjiang and Chinese policies

In the past seven decades, leaders in China have brought in policies to solidify control over Xinjiang through heavy militarisation and deployed a systematic migration of its majority Han population to dilute the influence of the Uyghur population. During former President Mao Zedong’s time (1949-1976), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was the key institution in controlling and suppressing any separatist voices, and during Deng Xiaoping regime (1978-1992), economic reforms were introduced to include XUAR in the mainstream economic development.

In 1990, the Baren Uprising—one of the first significant instances of violent faceoffs between Uyghurs and the Chinese state—led to a military crackdown on protestors. Later, Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) continued prioritising economic development but increasingly linked it with security measures. China’s “Western Development” strategy, launched in 2000, aimed to integrate Xinjiang more closely with the rest of China through infrastructure and investment, which saw key infrastructure projects being constructed, such as the West-East Gas Pipeline and the Lanzhou–Xinjiang Railway.

However, during Hu Jintao’s era (2003-2013), Xinjiang saw the worst instability following the Urumqi Riots in July 2008. Urumqi—the regional capital—was triggered by tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. The riots resulted in nearly 200 deaths and further escalated the crackdown on Uyghur communities. This event marked a turning point in Beijing’s approach to security in Xinjiang.

Xinjiang under Xi Jinping

Under Xi, there has been a dramatic shift toward changing demographics and curtailing religious freedom in Xinjiang. Several military and soft campaigns have been introduced, including the 2014 counter-terrorism campaign. What really caught the attention of the global community, including the UN and international human rights agencies, was the construction of the “re-education camps” in 2017.

These camps are allegedly detention centres where millions of Uyghurs and other minority Muslim populations have been subjected to cultural erasure and forced assimilation with the majority Han Chinese. From 2020 onwards, the United States imposed sanctions against Chinese officials and businesses involved in repressive policies in the region. China strongly countered, telling the US to “stop interfering in China’s internal affairs in any form and refrain from going further down the wrong path.”

Despite evidence from the UN, Human Rights Watch, and countries like the US documenting the systematic repression of Uyghurs by China, the OIC is looking the other way. This appears to stem from a desire to maintain diplomatic and economic ties with Beijing, with member states prioritising their own interests over the plight of the Uyghurs. For instance, Pakistan, which is heavily invested in the CPEC, chooses to remain strategically silent on the issue. This complicity risks undermining the OIC’s credibility as a champion of Muslim rights.

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