Examining the Rise in China Following Taiwan President William Lai’s National Day Address

On October 10, 2024, Taiwan President William Lai followed a long-held practice of delivering a speech marking the National Day of the Republic of China (commonly referred to in Taiwan as “Double Ten Day”). Past speeches have rarely been monitored closely by the international community, but Lai’s remarks were watched intently because China took the unprecedented step to respond to Lai’s May 2024 inauguration address with large-scale military drills, and the National Day speech was the first major speech Lai delivered since his inauguration.

Beijing again demonstrated its preference for relying on coercive measures. Four days after Lai’s speech, China conducted large-scale military exercises around Taiwan and several outlying islands, named “Joint Sword-2024B.” China’s maritime law enforcement forces also conducted unprecedented patrols around Taiwan. This ChinaPower feature tracks and analyzes China’s activities during the October 14 exercises and two weeks before and after the exercises.

Key Findings

China’s Joint Sword-2024B exercises showcase six critical features of Beijing’s approach toward Taiwan:

1. China continues to normalize the use of military exercises and law enforcement operations to respond to what it views as provocative non-military political activities by Taiwan. This marks the second time China has held large-scale, high-profile military exercises and coast guard patrols near Taiwan during Lai’s administration, and the fourth such occurrence since China began the practice in August 2022.1 In each case, the most prominent measure China used against Taiwan was its military exercise. Non-military measures played a supporting role.

This is the first time China has staged high-profile, large-scale activities in response to a National Day speech by a Taiwan president. China has staged more limited exercises around Double Ten Day. In 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced a night-time joint amphibious landing exercise near the coasts of Fujian and Guangdong provinces, but these were not the large-scale exercises that have become the norm since August 2022.

Official statements have made clear these exercises will continue. At a press conference, Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Wu Qian stated, “‘Joint Sword-2024B’ is not a repetition of 2024A, but rather an intensified pressure against ‘Taiwan independence.’ Every ‘Taiwan independence’ will prompt the PLA to advance one step further until the Taiwan issue is completely resolved.”

2. Chinese operations demonstrated growing coordination between the PLA and maritime law enforcement forces and the growing importance of the China Coast Guard (CCG). This showcased China’s intent to exercise for a range of scenarios, including a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan. 

The Taiwan MND reported 12 CCG vessels around the main island of Taiwan as part of China’s announced patrol around the island. Our research, based on Chinese ships broadcasting automatic identification system (AIS) data, showed one additional CCG vessel around the main island of Taiwan, bringing the total to 13 CCG vessels around the main island.

These CCG vessels largely operated in and near the six announced Joint Sword-2024B exercise zones. Compared to the exercises in May, where CCG vessels only operated outside the announced exclusion zones around the Taiwan Island, the CCG movements this time traversed within the PLA exercise zones, which suggests the CCG is operating more closely with the PLA Navy.

Overall, our research found 16 additional CCG vessels operating within the vicinity of Taiwan beyond what was publicized by Taiwan MND:

  • There were seven CCG vessels operating around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which is typically beyond the range reported on by Taiwan MND.
  • AIS data also showed four additional CCG vessels around Kinmen and three additional vessels around Dongyin. It is likely these CCG vessels were operating normally and not conducting “patrols” there, which is why Taiwan’s MND did not count these, but it is still notable that such a high level of CCG activity was visible.
  • CCG vessel 2303, which participated in joint patrol missions with the Russian coast guard, was also found to the northeast of the main island of Taiwan on October 14.
  • There were also differences in the location of vessels around Taiwan’s main island. A third CCG vessel was visible operating near Fleet 2102, but was absent from Taiwan MND counts. On the other hand, Taiwan MND reported three CCG vessels operating with Fleet 2901, but one of these did not show up in AIS data。

Closer coordination between the PLA and maritime law enforcement indicates Beijing’s desire to level up their ability to conduct joint operations, such as a quarantine or blockade. In such scenarios, Chinese maritime law enforcement forces could take the lead in interdicting noncompliant civilian vessels, freeing up the PLA to focus on deterring outside military intervention. The CCG can also fill in gaps in PLA Navy vessel deployments, which can enhance Beijing’s overall domain awareness around Taiwan.

3. Compared to prior large-scale Chinese military exercises, Joint Sword-2024B was designed to be short and sharp. It was the shortest of the four large-scale PLA exercises around Taiwan since 2022, lasting only about 13 hours according to the timestamps of official announcements. Similar to some of the prior exercises, the drills were not announced in advance.

The exercise had six declared exercise zones—one more than the Joint Sword-2024A exercises in May. However, they were noticeably smaller than the past announced exercise zones. Each announced exercise zone intruded into Taiwan’s contiguous zone, with some venturing very close to Taiwan’s territorial waters.

Joint Sword-2024B involved a bigger single-day deployment of forces than observed in any of the past three exercises. The drills saw the highest recorded single-day air incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), a record number of Chinese ships operating around Taiwan, and a higher number of sorties from China’s aircraft carrier than the three prior exercises.

The differences between the October 2024 exercise and prior ones showcase that Beijing can vary the scope and intensity of its activities based on its perceptions of Taiwan’s behavior and other domestic and foreign policy considerations.

4. Joint Sword-2024B was delayed compared to prior exercises, and it is possible that China weighed competing calculations in deciding on the timing of the drills. In August 2022, China immediately announced large-scale exercises upon Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and commenced the exercises two days later. In April 2023, China again commenced exercises within two days of Tsai’s return from her transit through the United States. In May 2024, China commenced its large-scale military exercises within 3 days of Lai’s inauguration speech. This time, the PLA waited four days before announcing and commencing a shorter-duration exercise.

A variety of factors could have contributed to the delay. There could have been bureaucratic differences within China over how to respond and what could be done in a timely manner. Parts of the Chinese government may have wanted to impose more non-military punishment against Taiwan and at a faster pace. In May, it took China’s Ministry of Finance eleven days after Lai’s inauguration speech to publicly announce it would reinstate tariffs on 135 items it imports from Taiwan.

On October 12, the Taiwan Affairs Office released a public statement that strongly encouraged relevant departments (China’s Ministry of Finance) to take additional measures against Taiwan based on China’s investigation of Taiwan’s “discriminatory” trade measures, but as of October 29, China’s Ministry of Finance has yet to take action against Taiwan after Lai’s National Day speech.

China’s economic situation could have also shaped Beijing’s decisionmaking regarding timing. On Saturday, October 12, China’s Minister of Finance Lan Fo’an and other officials convened a press conference to discuss fiscal measures the government would take to support the country’s ailing economy. That briefing was closely watched by both domestic and international investors and it dominated news headlines coming out of China over the weekend. Chinese officials may have delayed commencing PLA activities to minimize any unintended fallout that could heighten concerns about China’s economy. Economic policymakers may also have been so preoccupied with China’s domestic situation that they had limited bandwidth to work on reinstating tariffs on Taiwan in a timely manner.

It is also possible that decionmakers chose to wait longer to launch exercises to add an element of uncertainty and unpredictability.

5. China may have also wanted to sequence and time Joint Sword-2024B with other activities for maximum political and deterrent effect, showcasing that China has strong partners and influence. China’s exercise around Taiwan occurred before China wrapped up its concurrent joint naval and coast guard patrols with Russia. On the day of Joint Sword-2024B, Russian defense chief Andrey Belousov visited Beijing and met with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. A day later, on October 15, Belousov met with Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission and vowed to strengthen their cooperation. This overlap with high-level China-Russia defense engagement and military exercises is new. This was not observed in any of the three prior large-scale PLA exercises around Taiwan.

Also on October 14, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi called the foreign ministers of Iran and Israel to discuss regional stability in the Middle East. This is not the first time that China has sought to engage with Iran during or around the time of a PLA exercise around Taiwan. Wang Yi called his Iranian counterpart during the August 2022 exercise and China hosted the foreign ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Beijing right before its April 2023 exercises. China likely seeks to showcase not only its relations with Iran, but that it contributes to global peace and stability even as Beijing engages in de-stabilizing actions in the Taiwan Strait.

Additionally, from October 14 to 17, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) hosted military attachés from Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Jordan, UK, Kazakhstan, Canada, Argentina, New Zealand, and more than fifty other countries to tour and visit Jiangsu and Jiangxi. U.S. and Japanese representatives were not invited. The timing of the exercises and this military diplomacy program may not suggest that they were related, as such a visit was likely scheduled and planned way ahead of the exercises. However, China’s willingness to hold Joint Sword-2024B on the same day a large number of foreign military attachés would visit the same theater command reflected China’s determination to escalate actions and possible intent to associate the countries of the visiting military attachés as backing the exercises.

6. There was heightened overall PLA activity before and after Joint Sword-2024B. This is likely to be the norm moving forward. PLA activity before and after the military exercise likely had multiple intended targets. Some of the heightened PLA activity beforehand likely sought to deter or prevent both Taiwan and the United States from engaging in what China views as provocative activities. Continued Chinese activity after the exercise likely aimed to reinforce punishments against Taiwan and the United States and demonstrate control over Taiwan.

Some of China’s missile activity before and after the exercise appeared particularly aimed at signaling to the United States. This included China’s late September test launch of a DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is capable of striking targets in the continental United States. Additionally, Chinese leader Xi Jinping inspected a PLA Rocket Force brigade in mid-October that operates DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missiles, which can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads and reach U.S. military bases in Guam.

At 5 am local time on October 14, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) announced the beginning of Joint Sword-2024B drills around Taiwan.

The official notice stated, “With vessels and aircraft approaching Taiwan Island in close proximity from different directions, troops of multiple services [are engaging] in joint drills, focusing on subjects of sea-air combat-readiness patrol, blockade on key ports and areas, assault on maritime and ground targets, as well as joint seizure of comprehensive superiority, so as to test the joint operations capabilities of the theater command’s troops.” It added that the drills are meant as “a stern warning to the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan Independence’ forces,” and said they were a “legitimate and necessary operation for safeguarding state sovereignty and national unity.”2

Soon after, China’s MND released a map of the drills showing six zones around Taiwan, as well as smaller zones around the Taiwan-controlled outlying islands of Matsu, Dongyin, and Wuqiu. Unlike the Joint Sword-2024A exercises held in May, the outlying islands of Kinmen were not covered by an exercise zone. The exclusion of Kinmen from the exercises is notable and could indicate that Beijing feels it has already successfully routinized and normalized law enforcement activity there after a high tempo of CCG activity during Joint Sword-2024A and in the months before that.

The six main zones all encroached into Taiwan’s claimed “contiguous zone” but not cross into its territorial seas—a difference from May 2024 when the zones did extend into territorial waters. The official map also labeled six of Taiwan’s cities, suggesting each zone corresponds to a city. Notably, each city is home to one of Taiwan’s major ports or military bases, or both. This reinforced the idea that China was exercising how to quarantine or blockade Taiwan.